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A B S T R A C T
Background: Poor emotional self-awareness, often referred to as ‘alexithymia’ may be a common
area of difficulty in autism. However, emotional self-awareness is labelled and defined differently
in various strands of research, and is often measured by self-report. These issues may influence
differences in emotional self-awareness between autistic and non-autistic groups. Thus, we need
to examine how emotional self-awareness is defined and measured in this literature.
Method: We systematically reviewed studies comparing emotional self-awareness in autistic and
non-autistic participants. Forty-seven papers were identified for inclusion, and how emotional
self-awareness was defined was extracted from each. Thematic analysis was conducted on ex-
tracted definitions. The measurement tools used in each paper were also reviewed, to assess the
extent to which studies are reliant upon self-report.
Results: We identified seven key themes in definitions of emotional self-awareness, with little
consistency. Also, the themes identified mapped poorly onto the tools used to measure them.
Most studies relied exclusively on self-report, and few used more than one tool. Only three be-
havioural measurement tools were identified.
Conclusion: Emotional self-awareness has been variably defined by researchers in different
strands of autism research. Moreover, most studies exclusively use self-report alone to measure
this outcome, and this may not be reliable. To account for the multi-faceted nature of emotional
self-awareness, future research would benefit from specifically defining which aspect of emo-
tional self-awareness is under study and utilising multi-method approaches.
1. Introduction
Our emotions are important features of everyday life, informing and shaping our actions and social interactions. Recent theo-
retical work suggests that emotions are constructed, inferred from interoception (the sense of the internal body), as well as external
context and prior learning (Barrett, 2017; Seth, 2013). More importantly, how emotion is constructed varies from person to person
(Barrett & Satpute, 2019) - some experience and label emotions in discrete, differentiated manner, such as being able differentiating
between ‘disappointment’ and ‘anger’, while others have a 'fuzzier' awareness, limited to a general sense of valence and intensity
(‘good’ or ‘bad’). In extreme cases, some may not be able to recognise their own emotions at all (Lane, Ahern, Schwartz, & Kaszniak,
1997).
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Many different constructs have arisen in psychology to describe this ability to identify and understand one’s own emotions
(Kashdan, Barrett, & McKnight, 2015), but in this review we shall broadly refer to it as ‘emotional self-awareness’. At this point our
definition of emotional self-awareness remains intentionally vague, as a key aim of this review is to examine the range of definitions
used within the literature to arrive at a consensus position.
Current research suggests that variability in emotional self-awareness predicts social and emotional outcomes, including greater
emotional regulation and empathy (Smidt & Suvak, 2015). Emotional self-awareness difficulties are common in autism (Kinnaird,
Stewart, & Tchanturia, 2019), and such difficulties are suggested to predict emotional contagion and emotion recognition abilities in
this population, potentially more so than autistic symptoms (Bird & Cook, 2013). As such, emotional self-awareness may be a key
target for intervention and research within autism.
The notion that autistic people have greater difficulties understanding their own emotions is not new. Early Theory of Mind work
suggested that autistic people struggle to represent their own mental states as much as the mental states of others (Perner, Frith,
Leslie, & Leekam, 1989). Review work has found that autistic children have difficulties reporting their own intentions, beliefs, and
knowledge, particularly if these contradict feedback from the environment (Williams, 2010). Furthermore, it has been proposed that
emotional self-awareness difficulties, as conceptualised by alexithymia, may account for some of the emotional difficulties commonly
seen in autism (Bird & Cook, 2013), and that these are dissociable from core diagnostic symptoms of autism. Studying emotional self-
awareness in autism allows us to examine the extent to which emotional self-awareness may be dissociable from general commu-
nicative abilities. Accordingly, emotional self-awareness has become an increasingly prominent topic of study in autism over the past
decade, largely though the study of alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013).
Alexithymia is a construct from the psychosomatic literature, broadly referring to difficulties identifying and describing one’s own
emotions, among other things (Sifneos, 1973). Small, early studies found higher self-reported alexithymic traits in autistic adults
compared to comparable neurotypical controls (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Tani et al., 2004). More recently, a
meta-analysis confirmed that these differences are consistent across studies (Kinnaird et al., 2019), with autistic adults reporting
much higher levels of alexithymia than their neurotypical peers.
In studies with autistic adults, alexithymia scores correlate with diminished facial emotion recognition (Cook, Brewer, Shah, &
Bird, 2013; Oakley, Brewer, Bird, & Catmur, 2016) across both autistic and non-autistic groups. Similar effects have emerged for
ability to recognise emotional vocalisations (Heaton et al., 2012), as well as with hypo-activation in brain areas associated with
empathy (Bird et al., 2010). These findings suggest that alexithymia may predict difficulties with emotional recognition and empathy
in autism.
In these studies, alexithymia is largely measured through self-report questionnaires. Subjective experiences can only be rated by
mentally comparing one’s own behaviour and experiences to how other people act and feel. In other words, self-report asks parti-
cipants whether they consider themselves to have greater or poorer emotional self-awareness than the imagined average. However, it
is impossible to know how one’s own emotional experiences compare to others, and this can only be inferred through discussing
emotional experiences to form an internal model of how one compares to others. As people with autism have social communication
difficulties, they may have a weak model of how others experience emotion, and their self-report may be less valid.
To discuss these issues in further detail, it is helpful to place alexithymia within its appropriate historical context, tracking how
the definition and measurement of the construct has changed since its inception.
1.1. A history of alexithymia and emotional self-awareness
While it may be impossible to truly pin down the beginnings of emotional self-awareness research, the term ‘alexithymia’ was first
coined by Peter Sifneos (1973) to describe a pattern of impoverished imagination, utilitarian thinking, and communication diffi-
culties that he observed in his psychosomatic patients. These difficulties made such patients ill-suited to the traditional psycho-
analytic treatments of the time, making identification of these individuals an important issue.
Notably, these original descriptions of ‘alexithymia’ bear a resemblance to common features of autism. The diagnosis of autism is
based on difficulties within ‘social-emotional reciprocity’ particularly in terms of reduced sharing of emotion and difficulties in non-
verbal communication (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), similar to the communication difficulties and external cognitive
style Sifneos observed. Moreover, Sifneos’ work was published before autism was widely viewed as a ‘spectrum’ condition that can
affect adults and children without intellectual disability. This raises the possibility that Sifneos’ original observations were based on
adults who would now attract a diagnosis of autism, hence the overlap with many common autistic traits.
Alexithymia was popularised through two conferences centred on the construct. Proceedings from the latter conference were
published as a special edition of the journal ‘Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy’ (Sifneos, 1977), providing an empirical research
base for the construct. Moreover, the impressive speed at which ‘alexithymia’ was adopted into use likely reflects both the utility and
clinical resonance of Sifneos’ original observations. Undoubtedly, the term was, and remains, a useful way to describe a set of
clinically important behaviours.
Yet scholars warned that the alexithymia construct was at risk of reification (Lesser & Lesser, 1983; Wolff, 1977). At this stage,
alexithymia had yet to be fully validated as a stable personality trait, and doubt remained about whether it reflected one unitary trait
that remained stable over time (Lesser, 1981). Moreover, there was a great deal of inconsistency in how alexithymia was measured
and operationalised (Ahrens & Deffner, 1986), and measurement tools at the time were noted to be unreliable, poorly validated, and
psychometrically weak (Lesser, 1981; Taylor, 1984).
Nevertheless, this early work provided a foundation for extensive further research and the development of a brief, easy-to-
administer self-report tool, the 26-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-26; Taylor, Ryan, & Bagby, 1985). Given that previous
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measurement tools relied on long clinical observation and interview, the ease at which the TAS-26 could be administered and
analysed made it easier for researchers and clinicians from different fields to examine alexithymia in their work.
The TAS-26 consists of four key sub-scales, chosen due to their theoretical relation to alexithymia as well as their psychometric
robustness. These four subscales were: 1) the ability to identify and distinguish between feelings and bodily sensations; 2) the ability
to describe feelings; 3) tendency towards daydreaming and imagination; 4) externally-oriented thinking. The TAS-26 was later
revised into the 20-item version (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994; Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994), which has since become one
of the most common ways to measure alexithymia in research. During the revision from the TAS-26 to the TAS-20, the sub-scale
assessing imagination and fantasy was eliminated. This omission reflects one way in which the broader construct of the 1970s has
become the contemporary construct largely focused on ability to identify and describe emotions. However, the TAS-20 has accu-
mulated an impressive evidence base over the past 25 years demonstrating its psychometric robustness (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor,
2020), and remains one of the most well-validated measures of emotional self-awareness in the literature.
Despite this, some have suggested that the TAS-20 is measures general psychological distress, rather than a unique, stable per-
sonality trait (Leising, Grande, & Faber, 2009). TAS-20 scores are strongly associated with negative affect (Leising et al., 2009), as
well as scores of depression (Honkalampi, Hintikka, Laukkanen, Lehtonen, & Viinamäki, 2001). Longitudinal studies have likewise
found that TAS-20 scores fluctuate with changes in general mental health symptoms, such as anxiety or depression (Marchesi,
Bertoni, Cantoni, & Maggini, 2008, 2014).
Nevertheless, neuroscientific evidence supports the validity of both the alexithymia construct, and the use of self-report measures
such as the TAS-20. Research has consistently found that higher self-reported alexithymia is associated with hypo-activation in brain
areas serving emotion perception (Grynberg et al., 2012) and awareness (Kano & Fukudo, 2013) but hyper-activation in somatic and
motor areas in response to physical sensation such as pain (Kano & Fukudo, 2013), as well as greater functional connectivity in these
areas (Liemburg et al., 2012). These findings suggest that self-reported alexithymia does reflect meaningful differences in emotional
self-awareness, with high alexithymia associated with a focus on ‘lower level’ aspects of emotional awareness, such as somatic
sensitivity (Moriguchi & Komaki, 2013). Moreover, alexithymia has also been associated with somatoform disorders (De Gucht &
Heiser, 2003), a well-recognised category of psychiatric disorders, although this is only in comparison to typical populations are not
to other psychiatric controls.
As such, whilst the construct has been well-validated as a dimensional trait, it may be more questionable as to whether alex-
ithymia is a ‘condition’ (Barrett, 2017) or ‘disorder’ (e.g., Heaton et al., 2012). Although sometimes described as a categorical
disorder in research, it is not recognised as a distinct disorder in either the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) or the
ICD-11 (World Health Organisation, 2018). Within research, the majority of participants referred to as ‘alexithymic’ refer to a subset
of participants that fall above a certain cut-off point on the TAS-20, rather than a group that has underwent any formal diagnostic
process. While research supports the validity of alexithymia as at trait, describing alexithymia as a condition may be premature and
potentially misleading. Alexithymia is well-validated as a dimensional measure of individual differences, but this differs from a
categorically defined disorder based on a well-validated pattern of characteristic features. As such, how it is measured and defined
within the autism literature may benefit from close examination.
Within the wider emotion literature, emotional self-awareness is conceptualised in many different ways (Kashdan et al., 2015), all
with their own strengths and limitations. One popular approach is emotion differentiation (also known as ‘granularity’). Closely
linked to constructionist theories of emotion (Barrett, 2017), this approach focuses on individual variability in which people apply
discrete emotional labels to affective experiences. In other words, how well one can differentiate between similar emotional ex-
periences. Differentiation and granularity are widely regarded as interchangeable terms and are usually measured through experience
sampling of an individual’s lived emotional experiences (Smidt & Suvak, 2015). The strength of correlation between ratings of similar
emotional states are assessed over time, with higher correlations reflecting poorer differentiation between discrete emotional states
and thus poorer granularity.
Another approach to emotional self-awareness is the developmental framework proposed by Lane and Schwartz (1987), in which
emotional awareness was conceptualised as a cognitive skill that develops in Piaget-like stages. At the most basic level, emotional
self-awareness begins with awareness of interoceptive sensation. This progresses eventually to action and general affect awareness,
and then to awareness of single discrete emotional states, before finally moving onto more complex blends of emotions. The level at
which an individual is performing is usually assessed with the “Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale” (LEAS), a free-writing vignette
task in which individuals imagine themselves in various emotional scenarios and describe how they would feel in such a situation
(Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990).
Performance on LEAS tends to correlate only weakly with TAS-20 scores (Maroti, Lilliengren, & Bileviciute-Ljungar, 2018), with
some work even finding that greater TAS-20 scores predict better LEAS performance (Versluis et al., 2018). LEAS scores more strongly
correlate with differentiation (Smith et al., 2019). This is likely to occur because both differentiation and the LEAS focus on how
precisely individuals can use language to label and describe emotional experiences. This also raises the difficulty of whether one can
separate core ability to identify one’s own feelings from and general language ability.
Another common concept employed within typical populations is emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), in which
emotional awareness and other similar constructs are conceptualised as forms of intelligence. Within this approach, emotional
awareness is often split into the concepts of attention (how people attend to and value their own emotions) and clarity (how people
identify and label their emotions) (Thompson & Boden, 2019). These tend to be measured through self-report outcomes, although
such measures are often integrated into wider emotional intelligence tests (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). Furthermore,
measures of awareness of one’s own emotions are often integrated with awareness of other’s emotions, making it difficult to dis-
tinguish between these outcomes in the resultant data.
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While the focus on how individuals label and describe their own emotions is similar to the contemporary alexithymia approach,
these approaches differ significantly in how they are measured. In alexithymia studies, emotional self-awareness is often exclusively
measured with self-report. Yet in the wider literature, vignette tasks and experience sampling are also seen.
Another concept important to emotional self-awareness is interoception. Interoception is the sense of physiological condition of
the body (Craig, 2002), such as ability to detect somatic cues such as heartbeat, muscular and visceral sensations, and pain. Inter-
oception has been theoretically linked to sense of self and bodily ownership (Seth, 2013), and greater sensitivity to interoceptive cues
has been associated with greater emotional self-awareness (Barrett, 2014). Interoception has also been theoretically implicated as
important in autism, with some accounts suggesting that interoceptive difficulties may underpin a wide array of autistic symptoms
(Quattrocki & Friston, 2014), on the assumption that autism is associated with diminished interoceptive abilities. Despite this,
empirical findings on interoception in autism tend to be equivocal (DuBois, Ameis, Lai, Casanova, & Desarkar, 2016). Some studies
find no significant differences in interoceptive accuracy between autistic and non-autistic groups (Schauder, Mash, Bryant, & Cascio,
2015; Faillia et al., 2020), and other find diminished interoception in autism only on certain tasks (Palser, Fotopoulou, Pellicano, &
Kilner, 2018), or on self-report outcomes (Fiene & Brownlow, 2015). Other scholars have suggested that any interoceptive difficulties
in autism may be accounted for by elevated alexithymia (Hatfield, Brown, Giummarra, & Lenggenhager, 2017), with some empirical
findings supporting this assertion (Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016).
While interoceptive ability is likely to be closely related to emotional self-awareness, it is not itself a direct measure of emotional
self-awareness. As such, while physiological measures may be a useful way to measure emotional self-awareness (as seen in Gaigg,
Cornell, & Bird, 2018), we decided not to explicitly include interoception studies alone as measures of emotional self-awareness.
Overall, the wider literature suggests that emotional self-awareness may be a frequent area of difficulty in autism and that these
difficulties may be clinically and theoretically important. However, there are overlapping and yet disparate strands of research, such
as those investigating alexithymia and granularity, and the relationships between them are unclear. Therefore, to assess whether
emotional self-awareness is diminished in autism, we must first examine how it is defined and measured in research comparing
autistic and non-autistic groups.
1.2. The current review
This report presents the first part of a systematic literature review examining emotional self-awareness in autism. The review was
initially designed to examine group differences in emotional self-awareness but the challenge arose of defining this term and its
scope, and so this paper aims to address that specific problem. Due to the volume of qualitative data addressing this question, we
concluded that this should constitute its own paper. Therefore, in this report we examine the conceptual basis employed, and
methodological quality of existing research pertaining to emotional self-awareness in autism. A second report will cover the findings
of these studies. As such, the scope of this review is limited to studies with typical comparison groups.
2. Research questions & aims
1 How is emotional self-awareness defined in autism research?
a Systematically review how emotional self-awareness is defined in papers comparing group differences in emotional self-
awareness between autistic and non-autistic groups.
b Identify main themes of emotional self-awareness definitions used in research.
2 How is emotional self-awareness measured in autism research?
3 Systematically review which measurement tools are used when comparing group differences in emotional self-awareness between
autistic and non-autistic groups.
4 Examine proportion of studies which use self-report measures compared to other tools, such as observer-report or behavioural
measures.
3. Methodology
The current review followed PRISMA guidelines for systematic reviews. The protocol for the current review is registered on the
PROSPERO database (identification number CRD42017082052), available online at https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO/
display_record.php?RecordID = 82052. Quantitative meta-analyses of group differences can be found in a separate report
(Huggins, Donnan, Cameron & Williams, in prep).
3.1. Eligibility criteria
Inclusion criteria were as follows: (a) the sample included participants of any age with a diagnosis of autism, including Autism,
Asperger’s, Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, and Autism Spectrum Condition; (b) the sample included a
control group of healthy, non-autistic participants of any age; (c) the study included at least one measure explicitly assessing
awareness of one’s own emotional states. This is defined as the ability to be aware of one’s own emotional states, including the
abilities to identify, differentiate between, or describe one’s own emotions. Furthermore, this measure must be clearly distinct from
measures assessing the ability to identify or describe other people’s emotions. Finally, measures of interoception, such as the
heartbeat perception task, were not included. While theoretically relevant, these measure awareness of physical feelings that are
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distinct from emotion (see Pace-Schott et al., 2019, for a review), and were thus not included in this review.
Items were excluded based on the following criteria: (a) study was not published in English, (b) study was not an empirical paper
published in a peer-reviewed journal, (c) study did not include at least one measure specifically assessing the construct of interest, as
defined above, or (d) study matched autistic and non-autistic groups on emotional self-awareness. Excluding studies without a
comparison group or those that matched groups on emotional self-awareness was conducted for the benefit of the quantitative meta-
analysis, which can be found in a separate report (Huggins, Donnan, Cameron, & Williams, in prep).
3.2. Search strategy
Searches were conducted on the databases Scopus, Web of Science, ScienceDirect, PsychARTICLES, Embase, Medline, and
PsychINFO. The search was conducted across two stages to provide a comprehensive view of the literature. Due to the size of the
literature, the first stage only searched abstracts, title, and keywords, and identified key measurement tools. The second stage
searched full text of articles for these measurement tools. Searches covered all published reports across all years until May 2018.
In initial searches, databases were searched for any articles which had any combination of the following keywords in the Title,
Abstract, and Keywords sections: (1) “autism” or “ASD” or “ASC or “Autism Spectrum Disorder” or “Autism Spectrum Condition” or
“autistic” or “Asperger” or “PDD-NOS” or “Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified”, and (2) “alexithymia” or
“emotional awareness” or “emotional differentiation” or “emotion differentiation” or “emotional granularity” or “emotional in-
telligence” or “emotional competence” or “emotion labelling” or “emotional labelling”. Terms were based on a review by Kashdan
et al. (2015).
Following first stage searches, key measurement tools and related terms were identified. To ensure search was comprehensive,
second stage full-text searches using these terms were conducted.
3.3. First stage search strategy and study selection
Abstracts and titles were screened by CH and GD separately, based on eligibility criteria outlined above, and collated at a later
date. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
During title and abstract screenings, 21 papers were excluded for being in a language other than English, 180 for not being
empirical papers, 174 for not including a sample of participants with an autism diagnosis, 27 for not including a sample of non-
autistic controls, and 43 for not including an explicit measure of emotional self-awareness. Following this, final agreed-upon list of
items for full-text screenings was 68.
Full-text screenings were also conducted by CH and GD separately, before being collated at a later date. During full-text screenings
16 studies were excluded for not including any direct measure of emotional self-awareness, 5 for being student dissertations, 2 studies
included no typically developing comparison group, 1 item was a conference abstract, 1 item was a study protocol, and 1 was not in
English. After excluding these 25 items, 42 items were agreed upon by both researchers. 8 papers were excluded from further analyses
as participants were matched by alexithymia, resulting in a final dataset of 34 papers.
Data was extracted through the use of a standardised data extraction form. Prior to extracting the full set, the form was piloted
with five articles. Following review the data form was amended to account for comparisons between low and high emotional self-
awareness groups. Using the second version of the data extraction form, CH and GD then separately extracted data from the initial set
of 34 articles.
3.4. Second stage search strategy and study selection
Following initial analyses, the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) was identified as the most frequently used mea-
surement tool in the literature. Due to the popularity of the TAS-20 as a tertiary outcome or confounding factor unlikely to be
mentioned in the abstract or title, full-text searches were conducted. As a result, 11 further papers were identified for addition to the
current dataset. Due to the high amount of papers identified this way, further full-text searches were conducted for all of the
identified measurement tools.
Additional search terms can be seen in Supplementary Information, Table A. All search terms combined with previously used
autism terms, searching across full-text, abstract, titles, and keywords in all databases, with searches covering all published reports
until May 2018. Across these additional searches, only one further paper was identified for inclusion. One additional paper was
further identified by word of mouth as it fell only slightly out of the range of searches.
The final dataset consisted of 47 papers. Abbreviated PRISMA flow chart of the search process can be seen in Fig. 1.
3.5. Narrative synthesis
Narrative synthesis was conducted across the full dataset of 47 papers. Participant data items extracted for this synthesis included
the number of participants, and their gender ratios, average ages and age ranges, for both autistic and non-autistic groups in each
study. Measurement tools were classed as parent-report, self-report or behavioural tasks. Terms were extracted, alongside their
definitions when available in the text.
CH conducted thematic analysis on definitions. Definitions were coded twice. The first coding produced an initial set of 9 themes.
In the second coding, overlapping themes were combined to minimise repetition and improve robustness, resulting in a total of 7
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themes, outlined below. See Table 1 for extracted definitions and final coding.
4. Results
4.1. Frequencies of terms and tools
34 of the 47 papers used the term ‘alexithymia’ as the primary term to describe the construct assessed by their measurement tool.
Other terms used included emotional awareness (3), emotional intelligence (3), emotion differentiation (1), emotion labelling (1),
social cognition (1), emotional processing (1), emotional processing and reflection (1), and awareness of multiple emotions (1). Five
studies used multiple terms to describe emotional self-awareness. All five of these studies used ‘alexithymia’ as a secondary term.
Of the 47 studies included in the current analysis, the majority (41) used only one emotional self-awareness measurement tool.
The remaining six used two measurement tools. No studies used more than two tools, and the majority of studies used only self-report
tools (42). Two studies exclusively used parent-report tools, and two exclusively used behavioural tasks. Only one study used both
self- and parent-report measures.
11 unique emotional granularity tools were identified overall: six self-report, two informant-report, and three behavioural tasks.
The most common tool was the TAS-20, a self-report measure used in 29 of papers. The frequencies of each different measurement
tool as well as summaries of each can be seen in Table 2.
Seven studies characterised emotional self-awareness as a personality trait, while three described it as a process. Within the 34
studies that used the term alexithymia, four described it as a deficit, three as a condition, and one as a disorder. Seven studies
provided no definition of emotional self-awareness.
4.2. Defining emotional self-awareness
Qualitative analysis identified seven themes frequently used to describe and define emotional self-awareness in the dataset. These
were as follows: (a) Identifying Own Emotions; (b) Communicating Own Emotions; (c) Imagination and Externally Oriented
Thinking; (d) Interpreting Own Emotions; (e) Interoception; (f) Empathising With and Recognising the Emotions of Others; (g)
Differentiating Between Own Emotions. See Table 1 for full set of extracted definitions and codings. Further details of each theme are
outlined below.
4.2.1. Identifying own emotions
This first theme refers to the ability to identify that one is having an emotional experience. This reflects the broad ability to
consciously recognise that one is experiencing an emotion, and internally represent it in affective terms (e.g., feeling ‘good’ or feeling
‘bad’).
Examples of the ‘Identifying Own Emotions’ theme includes descriptions such as “ability to recognise one’s own emotions” (Brezis
Fig. 1. “PRISMA Flow Chart of Search Process” near here.
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Table 1
Definition of the emotional self-awareness construct in each study, highlighting coded themes. (Murray et al., 2017; Rieffe, Terwogt, &
Kotronopoulou, 2007; Brady et al., 2014; Patil, Melsbach, Hennig-Fast, & Silani, 2016; Ketelaars, Velt, Mol, Swaab, & van Rijn, 2016; Samson,
Huber, & Gross, 2012; Schneider et al., 2013; Berthoz, Lalanne, Crane, & Hill, 2013; Courty et al., 2013; McCrimmon, Matchullis, & Altomare, 2016;
Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Dijkhuis, Ziermans, Van Rijn, Staal, & Swaab, 2017; McCrimmon, Climie, & Huynh, 2017;
Kopec, Hillier, & Frye, 2014; Boily, Kingston, & Montgomery, 2017; Arellano et al., 2018; Brewer et al., 2016; Brewer, Biotti, Bird, & Cook, 2017;
Fan, Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng, 2014; Gu et al., 2015; Krach et al., 2015; Lai et al., 2013; Lombardo et al., 2010; Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen,
Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009; Karbasdehi, Abolghasemi, & Karbasdehi, 2018; Wieckowski & White 2017; Mul, Stagg, Herbelin, & Aspell, 2018).
(continued on next page)
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et al., 2017), or “recognition […] of one’s own emotions” (Duijkers, Vissers, Verbeeck, Arntz, & Egger, 2014).
4.2.2. Communicating own emotions
‘Communicating Own Emotions’ refers to the ability to communicate one’s own emotional states to others. This mostly focuses on
Table 1 (continued)
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verbally describing subjective emotional experiences in language, but also can apply to expressing emotions through facial ex-
pression, gesture, and tone of voice.
Examples of the ‘Communicating Own Emotions’ theme includes descriptions such as “describing one’s own emotions or feelings”
(Griffin, Lombardo, & Auyeung, 2016), “communicating [emotions] to others” (Roberts-Collins, Mahoney-Davies, Russel, Booth, &
Loades, 2018), or “fluency in discussing one’s emotions” (Allen, Davis, & Hill, 2013).
4.2.3. Imagination and externally oriented thinking
This theme refers to the extent to which people engage in emotion-related fantasy, compared to focusing on external stimuli.
Greater emotional self-awareness is associated with greater affect-related fantasy. Poorer emotional self-awareness is associated with
an ‘externally thinking’ orientation, in which individuals focus on external details about the world. This is similar to Sifneos’ (1973)
original conceptualisation of the externally-oriented thinking aspects of the alexithymia construct, rather than directly to con-
temporary notions of emotional self-awareness.
Examples of the ‘Imagination and Externally Oriented Thinking’ theme includes descriptions such as “tendency to focus on
superficial events rather than thinking about emotions” (Hagenmuller, Rössler, Wittwer, & Haker, 2014), “external thinking or-
ientation that involves focus on external realities with limited self-reflective thought” (Trevisan, Bowering, & Birmingham, 2016),
and “paucity of fantasies and other imaginative activity” (Berthoz & Hill, 2005).
4.2.4. Interpreting own emotions
‘Interpreting Own Emotions’ refers to the ability to make sense of their emotional experiences in a meaningful way. This refers to
the ability to reflect on one’s emotional experiences in a meaningful way, understanding the causes of emotional experiences and
their impact on future behaviours.
Examples of the ‘Interpreting Own Emotions’ theme includes descriptions such as “interpreting one’s own feeling states” (Trevisan
et al., 2016), “capacity for emotional introspection” (Maisel et al., 2016), and “locate [emotion’s] antecedents” (Roberts-Collins et al.,
2018).
4.2.5. Interoception
‘Interoception’ refers to the ability to understand the relationship between bodily sensation and emotional experience. This
includes the ability to differentiate bodily sensations from emotional experiences, as well as to identify when bodily sensations are
caused by emotions.
Examples of the ‘Interoception’ theme includes descriptions such as “mapping feeling states onto internal bodily responses”
(Milosavljevic et al., 2016), “distinguishing feelings from bodily sensations of emotional arousal” (Hill et al., 2004), and “altered
emotional interoception” (Bernhardt et al., 2014).
4.2.6. Empathising with and recognising the emotions of others
This theme refers to the ability to identify the emotions of others, as well as to general references to empathy. Examples include
“recognising others’ emotions” (Thaler et al., 2018), “naming emotional facial expressions” (Kätsyri, Saalasti, Tiippana, von Wendt, &
Sams, 2008), and “empathising” (Bernhardt et al., 2014).
4.2.7. Differentiating between own emotions
‘Differentiating Between Own Emotions’ refers to the ability to make distinctions between similar discrete emotional states. For
instance, being able to tell the difference between feeling ‘relaxed’ and ‘happy’, or between feeling ‘disappointed’ and ‘angry’. This is
similar to the concept of ‘emotional granularity’ (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001).
Examples of this theme includes “differentiate emotions” (Roberts-Collins et al., 2018), “ability to make fine-grained distinctions
between emotional states” (Erbas, Ceulemans, Boonen, Noens, & Kuppens, 2013), and “distinguish one’s feelings” (Silani et al., 2008).
4.2.8. Frequencies
Across all 47 studies, ‘Communicating Own Emotions’ was the most common theme identified in definitions of emotional self-
awareness, used in 30 (63.8 %) studies. The second most common aspect was ‘Identifying Own Emotions’ which was identified in 27
(57.5 %) studies. This is followed by ‘Interpreting Own Emotions’, which was identified in the definitions of 15 (31.9 %) studies each.
‘Interoception’ was identified in the definitions of 14 (29.8 %) studies.
The ‘Imagination and Externally Oriented Thinking’ theme was identified in the definitions of only 11 (23.4 %) papers.
‘Differentiating Between Own Emotions’ was identified in 5 (10.6 %) papers’ definitions, and ‘Recognising Emotions of Others’ was
identified in only 3 (6.4 %) papers. A table showing frequency of overlap between themes can be seen in Table 3.
5. Discussion
We set out to systematically review the evidence for a deficit of emotional self-awareness in autism, but we first needed to
examine how this construct is conceptualised in this literature. To do so, we conducted thematic analysis of extracted definitions of
emotional self-awareness and reviewed the measurement tools used to assess these outcomes. Emotional self-awareness was con-
ceptualised in many ways, indicating it may be best understood as a multifaceted construct, and was primarily measured through self-
report. These may have implications for both interpretation of existing findings and development of future research.
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5.1. Defining emotional self-awareness
Our review demonstrated that definitions of emotional self-awareness varied throughout the literature, even in studies using the
same measurement tool. Analysing the definitions we identified 7 main themes. These mapped onto a broad range of cognitive
functions including perception of somatic states (‘Interoception’), meta-representation of and attention to emotional states
(‘Identifying Own Emotions’, ‘Imagination and Externally Oriented Thinking’), and the linguistic and social communicative aspects of
emotion understanding (‘Interpreting Own Emotions’, ‘Communicating Own Emotions’, ‘Empathising With and Recognising the
Emotions of Others’).
No single theme emerged in all studies, and no themes appeared consistently with one another. The most common source of
overlap is ‘Identifying Own Emotions’ with ‘Communicating Own Emotions’, which appeared together in 24 studies – likely due to
their relevance to the alexithymia construct. Despite this, only 11 studies defined emotional self-awareness in terms of ‘Imagination
and Externally Oriented Thinking’, and this did not always overlap with ‘Identifying’ and ‘Communicating’.
Two conclusions emerge. Firstly, definitions of alexithymia in autism research have largely moved away from the classic model
proposed by Sifneos (1973). As outlined in the introduction, alexithymia was originally defined mostly in terms of a cognitive style
which prioritised focus on external events and psychosomatic behaviour, over internal experience. Definitions of alexithymia now
focus more on the capacity to demonstrate a conscious awareness of emotions, rather than clinical behaviours indicative of low
emotion and high somatisation outlined by Sifneos. Therefore, research may benefit from differentiating between emotional self-
awareness as a dimensional construct and somatisation as a clinical problem which may fall more under the rubric of ‘classical’
alexithymia or somatoform disorders.
Secondly, emotional self-awareness may be better considered as a ‘macro’ construct with underlying facets. Research using fMRI
(Moriguchi & Komaki, 2013) has shown that individual variability is most heavily accounted for by differences in limbic and sensory
areas of the brain, rather than prefrontal areas, suggesting that individual differences are largely driven by reactivity of emotion and
sensory brain areas to emotional inputs. However, some definitions relate more to complex, cognitive aspects of emotional experi-
ence, such as interpreting emotional states, communicating them to others, and empathising with them in others. In addition,
linguistic functions are necessary for expression and communication. Therefore, research into emotional self-awareness, including
alexithymia, may benefit by specifying which aspect it is examining and including appropriate controls for other aspects.
The frequency of, and overlap between, themes does not necessarily indicate that these are the ‘correct’ ways to define emotional
self-awareness. Rather, these analyses summarise past research trends and demonstrates gaps in the existing literature. For instance,
little work has discussed ‘Differentiating between emotions’, and rarely in tandem with other themes. This does not indicate that
differentiation is irrelevant but simply that this avenue has been little explored. Given increasing focus on differentiation as a
predictor of socioemotional outcomes (Smidt & Suvak, 2015), this may be a fruitful area of future research.
5.2. Measuring emotional self-awareness
The second aim of the study was to examine how emotional self-awareness is measured in studies comparing autistic and non-
autistic groups. As anticipated, measurement was mostly based on self-report questionnaires. Of the 47 studies identified in the
review, 42 (89 %) used exclusively self-report measures. The TAS-20 also emerged as the most common measurement tool, used in 62
% of total studies. Behavioural measurement tools were the least common – only three were identified, and each was only used once.
While most measurement tools at least partially reflected the definitions used by researchers, this was not always the case. For
instance, although ‘Externally Oriented Thinking’ is an explicit subscale of the TAS-20, only 11 of the 29 papers that used the TAS-20
included the theme ‘Imagination and Externally Oriented Thinking’ in their definition of emotional self-awareness. Three studies
Table 3
Observed and expected frequencies with which themes were identified together in the same paper.
Notes: Italics indicates expected frequency of overlap based on total observed frequency for each theme. Expected frequencies rounded up to nearest
integer.
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using the TAS-20 also defined emotional self-awareness in terms of ‘Recognising the Emotions of Others’, and this is not included in
any items of the TAS-20. As mentioned above, future research may benefit from ensuring that measurement tool reflects the aspect of
emotional self-awareness under examination.
The reliance on self-report measures may be a source of error. Even among typical sociable adults, it is not possible to truly know
how one’s inner emotional experiences compare to those of others. In line with this, empirical evidence finds that self-reported
emotional abilities are only weakly correlated with comparable behavioural measures (Lumley, Gustavson, Partidge, & Labouvie-
Vief, 2005; Keefer, 2015). As people with autism may be less likely to discuss their emotions with others, self-report may be par-
ticularly unreliable in this population. Self-report also requires general meta-cognitive abilities, which may be adversely affected in
autism (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2014; Williams, Lind, & Happé, 2009; Zalla, Miele, Leboyer, & Metcalfe, 2015). Finally, people
with low emotional self-awareness may have more general difficulties with self-awareness, and thus may struggle to accurately report
on their feelings. Therefore, using self-report measures to determine group differences in emotional self-awareness may be inherently
problematic (Marchesi et al., 2014).
The TAS-20 was used as the primary measure of emotional self-awareness in over half of the total sample. As previously discussed,
the TAS-20 has been criticised due to its strong association with general negative affect (Lumley, 2000). TAS-20 scores also fluctuate
in line with mental health symptoms (Marchesi et al., 2008, 2014), raising concerns that the TAS-20 may measure psychological
distress, rather than a stable trait (Leising et al., 2009). Moreover, autistic people show high rates of mental health conditions such as
anxiety and depression (Simonoff et al., 2008), as well as poorer life satisfaction (Schmidt et al., 2015). As such, TAS-20 scores in
autism may be elevated by co-morbid mental disorders and greater negative affectivity in the population, rather than by stable
differences in emotional self-awareness.
Nevertheless, there are many advantages to using self-report questionnaires and a great deal of evidence supports the validity of
the TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 2020). Moreover, behavioural measures also come with limitations – they are often not as well-validated
and can be difficult to implement. Furthermore, in the case of emotional self-awareness, behavioural measures are just as reliant on
inference. However, our review has demonstrated that the existing evidence base for emotional self-awareness in autism is very
heavily based on self-report measures. Consequently, the limitations of evidence from self-report measures are not overcome by
supportive evidence using other methodologies.
As discussed in the introduction, self-reported alexithymia has been associated with both neural and behavioural differences, in
particular hypo-activation in response to emotional stimuli and elevated responses to somatosensory and sensorimotor stimuli
(Moriguchi & Komaki, 2013). As such, self-report measures such as the TAS-20 may largely be capturing individual differences in
attention and reactivity to emotional inputs and not be tapping into individual differences in ‘higher level’ aspects of emotional self-
awareness, such as interpretation or labelling. Capturing individual differences in these more complex abilities may necessitate use of
alternate measurement tools.
Developing more behavioural methods of assessing emotional self-awareness is therefore a goal of current research. In the current
review, only three behavioural methods were identified: the Photo Emotion Differentiation task (PED-task), the Emotion Sorting task
(ES-task), and the Multiple Emotions Task (MET), see Table 2 for details.
Of the three behavioural tasks identified in the current study, the PED-task seems the most feasible for measuring emotional self-
awareness. While the ES-task may rely on semantic knowledge of emotion terms, rather than actual emotional experiences, the PED-
task aims to examine real emotional experiences. The PED-task also allows for more complex responses than the MET, which may
only be appropriate for younger children or assessing basic capacity. It also bears strong similarities to experience sampling para-
digms (Barrett et al., 2001; Kashdan & Farmer, 2014). Despite this, the PED-task has some potential statistical issues. A recent meta-
analysis of PED-task datasets found that 7.5%–42.6% of scores were uninterpretable and subsequently excluded (Erbas et al., 2019).
Thus, depending on type of statistical analysis used, the PED-task can result in large amounts of missing data. Further work is needed
to address these potential issues before this task can be widely implemented.
Notably, no papers in our dataset utilised either experience sampling methods or the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS;
Lane et al., 1990). This may reflect the practical challenges they pose in autistic populations. The LEAS relies on written reports of
emotional experiences, requiring participants to imagine themselves in emotional situations. These verbal and imaginative demands
may make it difficult for many autistic participants. Experience sampling tends to be longitudinal and places a high-burden on
participants, and thus may be challenging to successfully implement in autistic samples given high rates of mental illness, difficulties
with executive function, and needs to adhere to routine common in this population. All the same, the absence of these two measures
represents a significant inconsistency with the wider emotion literature. Future research may benefit from adapting these two
methodologies for use in autistic samples.
5.3. Implications and future directions
There is a strong theoretical precedent for the notion that emotional self-awareness is diminished in autism. As discussed in the
introduction, the original observations made by Sifneos (1973) bear some resemblance to how autism tends to manifest in in-
tellectually able adults, raising the possibility that emotional self-awareness difficulties may be a central characteristic of autism.
Diagnosis of autism rests on "deficits in social-emotional reciprocity….", including "…reduced sharing of interests, emotions, or affect"
and "deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviours used for social interaction" (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In most
widely accepted diagnostic instrument in research and clinical practice, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS), im-
paired communication of social affect is the main factor onto which items load in the diagnostic algorithm (Gotham et al., 2011). This
includes items such as directed facial expression, gesture, shared enjoyment and social reciprocity.
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Therefore, whilst the diagnosis of autism does not explicitly include emotional self-awareness, it seems unlikely that emotion self-
awareness would be typical in individuals with such widespread and diagnostic weaknesses in emotional expression, sharing and
understanding. Furthermore, some of the themes identified in our review may be affected by autism symptoms. For instance, due to
the general social communication difficulties inherent in autism, it is likely most autistic people would show greater difficulties with
Communicating Own Emotions.
Cognitive research also supports the case for a strong overlap between autism and emotional self-awareness. Theory of Mind
difficulties in autism are argued to extend to difficulties with Theory of Own Mind, indicating that autistic populations often have
difficulty clearly representing their own mental states (Williams, 2010), and such difficulties seem likely to extend to representing
one’s own emotional states. In addition, our review of the emotional self-awareness concept indicates that it is most frequently
defined and measured in terms of attention to emotional experiences. Autism is associated with diminished attention to emotional
stimuli, including human faces (Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002), biological motion (Klin,
Lin, Gorrindo, Ramsay, & Jones, 2009), and emotional words (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, 2009). This lack of
attention to external emotional stimuli may also extend to internal emotional experiences. Therefore, the previously observed dif-
ference in self-reported alexithymia between autistic and non-autistic groups (Kinnaird et al., 2019) is unlikely to be wholly the
product of confounding factors. However, the weaknesses identified in this review may be exaggerating the extent of these differ-
ences, and thus warrant closer examination.
We have demonstrated that there is a marked paucity of behavioural methods of assessing emotional self-awareness and previous
work has similarly discussed the need for more objective ways to measure it (Bird & Cook, 2013; Hobson, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird,
2019). However, our review is the first to quantify the extent of the problem, finding that as many as 89 % of studies only measure
emotional self-awareness through self-report. Moreover, this is rarely in conjunction with other methods. These issues should be
addressed in future research through the development of more objective measures of emotional self-awareness and greater use of
mixed-method approaches.
Measuring the ability to identify or differentiate between emotions separately from ability to communicate emotions may be
particularly important in autism research, as this would allow us to differentiate emotional self-awareness difficulties in autism from
general communication difficulties. One possibility is to examine discrepancy between self-reported and physiological cues of
emotion (e.g., Gaigg et al., 2018). Psychophysical approaches have proved useful in assessing sensitivity to the facial emotional cues
(Marneweck, Loftus, & Hammond, 2013), and can be similar applied to sensitivity to own emotions through examining patterns in
emotional decision making (Huggins, Williams, & Cameron, 2018).
Our review may have implications for practice and intervention. As emotional self-awareness may predict socioemotional out-
comes such as emotion recognition and empathy, developing more robust measurement tools may be useful for clinical practice.
Utilising the themes developed in this study may also help more precisely target areas of difficulty in autistic patients, and more
effectively tailor intervention styles. For instance, emotion differentiation has been found to predict better and more adaptive
emotional regulation skills (Barrett et al., 2001). For autistic people with significant emotional regulation difficulties, being able to
specifically measure and improve differentiation abilities may be particularly beneficial. Finally, developing specific and targeted
behavioural measurement tools in research will allow us to better understand at what level emotional self-awareness difficulties arise,
and how this may impact autistic people’s health and well-being.
5.4. Limitations
There are some limitations to our review that warrant consideration. Firstly, we exclusively examined studies that included a non-
autistic control group. This was due to the review originally being conceived as a meta-analysis comparing group differences, with
this part of the study presented in a different report (Huggins, Donnan, Cameron & Williams, in prep). As a result of this, 29 studies
were excluded. Potentially, studies with only autistic participants may have used different measurement tools in assessing emotional
self-awareness, and thus our review may not be completely comprehensive. However, our findings are still useful in addressing how
conceptual and measurement issues may impact upon findings of differences in emotional self-awareness between autistic and non-
autistic groups, which was the key aim of the study.
Furthermore, our review excluded measures of interoception and measures that did not distinguish emotional self-awareness from
ability to identify the emotions of others. Despite this, interoception and the recognition of other’s emotions still emerged as themes.
While these exclusions were intended to make the review more specific to emotional self-awareness, more examples of these themes
may have emerged with more lenient exclusion criteria.
6. Conclusions
Our review identified overlaps and disparities between several strands of research investigating emotional self-awareness in
autism, and demonstrates the need for a more coherent model before we can examine group differences between autistic and non-
autistic populations. Moreover, we demonstrated that the majority of research is based on self-report questionnaire. The methodo-
logical issues in self-report questionnaires may result in emotional self-awareness difficulties in autism being exaggerated by co-
morbid mental health issues and meta-cognitive difficulties. With these problems in mind, it may be premature to conclude that
emotional self-awareness is significantly diminished in autism, though there are strong theoretical grounds for this to be the case. Our
findings suggest that we can best build upon existing research on alexithymia in autism by integrating it with other strands of emotion
research into a more complete, multi-faceted model of emotional self-awareness. From this, we can better develop more objective
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measurement tools to targeting specific facets of this model.
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